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The Istanbul pogrom (sometimes referred to as Septemvriana) was a government-
instigated series of riots against the Greek minority of Istanbul in September 1955.
It can be characterized as a ‘‘crime against humanity,’’ comparable in scope to the
November 1938 Kristallnacht in Germany, perpetrated by the Nazi authorities
against Jewish civilians.
The Septemvriana satisfies the criteria of article 2 of the 1948 Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (UNCG) because the ‘‘intent
to destroy in whole or in part’’ the Greek minority in Istanbul was demonstrably
present, the pogrom having been orchestrated by the government of Turkish Prime
Minister Adnan Menderes. Even if the number of deaths (estimated at thirty-seven)
among members of the Greek community was relatively low, the result of the
pogrom was the flight and emigration of the Greek minority of Istanbul, which once
numbered some 100,000 and was subsequently reduced to a few thousand. The vast
destruction of Greek property, businesses, and churches provides evidence of the
Turkish authorities’ intent to terrorize the Greeks in Istanbul into abandoning the
territory, thus eliminating the Greek minority. This practice falls within the ambit
of the crime of ‘‘ethnic cleansing,’’ which the UN General Assembly and the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia have interpreted as
constituting a form of genocide.
Turkey has been a party to the UNCG since 1950. Although it is not a party to the
1968 Convention on the Non-applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes
and Crimes against Humanity, modern international law imposes the principle of
non-prescription to genocide and crimes against humanity. Accordingly, the
obligation to punish the guilty and the responsibility of Turkey to make reparations
to the victims and their survivors have not lapsed.
Seen in isolation, the Istanbul pogrom can be considered a grave crime under both
Turkish domestic law and international law. In the historical context of a religion-
driven eliminationist process accompanied by many pogroms before, during, and
after World War I within the territories of the Ottoman Empire, including the
destruction of the Greek communities of Pontos and Asia Minor and the atrocities
against the Greeks of Smyrna in September 1922, the genocidal character of the
Istanbul pogrom becomes apparent. It should be noted, however, that whereas the
characterization of the Septemvriana as a form of genocide lends it greater
emotional impact, the legal consequences are essentially the same whether the
pogrom is classified under the rubric of genocide or as a crime against humanity.
Historical Overview
On 6–7 September 1955 violent riots (sometimes referred to as Septemvriana) occurred
against the Greek minority living in Istanbul. The event was comparable in scope to
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the 1938 Kristallnacht1 in Germany, perpetrated by the Nazi SS and SA against
Jewish synagogues and property in November 1938. In the weeks leading up to the
Istanbul pogrom,2 Turkish authorities had engaged in systematic incitement of public
opinion against the Greek minority, partly in connection with the ongoing dispute over
Cyprus.3 A student movement calling itself Cyprus Is Turkish was particularly
virulent in creating anti-Greek propaganda. On 28 August 1955 the largest daily
newspaper, Hu¨rriyet, threatened that ‘‘if the Greeks dare touch our brethren, then
there are plenty of Greeks in Istanbul to retaliate upon.’’4 At ten minutes past
midnight on 6 September 1955, an explosion occurred in the courtyard of the Turkish
Consulate in Thessaloniki, a building adjacent to the house where Kemal Atatu¨rk was
born. The press immediately blamed the Greeks and published photos of Atatu¨rk’s
house that purported to show extensive damage.5 At the 1960/1961 Yassiada trial
against Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and Foreign Minister Fatin Zorlu, it became
known that the explosion had been carried out by Turkish agents under orders from
the Turkish government.6
Beginning around 5:00 p.m.,7 Turkish mobs devastated the Greek, Armenian, and
Jewish districts of Istanbul, killing an estimated thirty-seven Greeks8 and destroying
and looting their places of worship,9 homes, and businesses. The pogrom was not
spontaneous but centrally organized: many of the rioters were recruited in Istanbul
and in the provinces by the Demokrat Parti authorities and taken into Istanbul by
train, in trucks, and by some 4,000 taxis with instructions on what to destroy and what
was to be spared.10 They were given axes, crowbars, acetylene torches, petrol,
dynamite, and large numbers of rocks in carts. Predictably, the riots got out of control,
with the mobs shouting ‘‘Evvela mal, sonra can’’ (‘‘First your property, then your
life’’).11 The Turkish militia and police who coordinated the pogrom refrained from
protecting the lives and property of the Greek victims.12 Their function was, rather,
to prevent Turkish property from being destroyed as well.
These events are best described in English by Speros Vryonis in his 2005 book
The Mechanism of Catastrophe, which also draws on a vast range of Turkish sources,
including the Yassiada trials, and on the substantive report published by Helsinki
Watch (now Human Rights Watch)13 in 1992 on violations of the human and civil
rights of the Greeks of Turkey. There is still no official Turkish government or police
report on the violence of 6–7 September 1955.
Besides the deaths, thousands were injured; some 200 Greek women were raped,14
and there are reports that Greek boys were raped as well.15 Many Greek men,
including at least one priest, were subjected to forced circumcision. The riots were
accompanied by enormous material damage,16 estimated by Greek authorities at
US$500 million, including the burning of churches and the devastation of shops17 and
private homes.18 As a result of the pogrom, the Greek minority eventually emigrated
from Turkey.19
After the fall of the Menderes government in 1960, Menderes and other organizers
of the pogrom were put on trial and convicted. The Yassiada trial of 1960/1961
provides abundant evidence as to the intent to terrorize and destroy the Greek
minority of Istanbul. Menderes, Zorlu, and their minister of economics, Hasan
Polatkan, were executed.20
Norms
Under customary international law, massacres such as occurred in Istanbul in
September 1955 constitute international crimes. There are many norms of
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international law, international humanitarian law, and international human-rights
law that are pertinent to an examination of the Istanbul pogrom. Under these norms,
the pogrom, taken in isolation, involves a multiplicity of violations of international law.
But it is in historical context that the Istanbul pogrom emerges as part of a genocidal
program aimed at the destruction of the Greek presence in all territories under
Turkish rule.
Massacres committed by the Ottoman authorities against the Armenians during
World War I were labeled ‘‘crimes against humanity and civilization’’ by the
British and the French governments as early as 1915.21 At the end of World War I,
the victorious Allies agreed that the atrocities committed against the Christian
minorities under Ottoman rule—including the Armenians; the Greeks of Pontos,
Asia Minor, and Eastern Thrace; and the Assyrians—should be investigated
and punished and that the material damage should be compensated. Relevant
precedents are article 230 of the Treaty of Se`vres,22 which stipulated the obligation
to punish, and art. 144, which stipulated the obligation to grant restitution
and compensation.23
Although the Ottoman state signed the Treaty of Se`vres, formal ratification never
followed, and the Allies did not follow through to ensure its implementation.24 Such
failure can be attributed to the growing international political disarray following
World War I, the rise of Soviet Russia, the withdrawal of the British military presence
from Turkey,25 the isolationist policies of the United States,26 the demise of the Young
Turk regime, and the rise of Kemalism in Turkey. Nevertheless, the criminality of the
massacres against Armenians, Greeks, and Assyrians had been acknowledged by the
international community, even though no Turkish official was ever tried before an
international tribunal and only a few were indicted, tried, and convicted by Turkish
courts-martial.
The term ‘‘genocide’’ was coined by the Polish jurist Raphael Lemkin in 1944 in
connection with the Nazi murder of the Jews. The London Agreement of 8 August 1945
laid down the indictment for the Nuremberg trials, including the offense of ‘‘crimes
against humanity’’ under art. 6(c) of the Nuremberg Statute.27
The 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(UNCG)28 did not create the crime of genocide, but it formalized and codified the
international prohibition of massacres. Article 1 of the UNCG stipulates that
‘‘genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under
international law’’; art. 2 provides that
genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or
in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) killing members of the group;
(b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part
Turkey acceded to the convention on 31 July 1950, more than five years before the
events of September 1955.
Of crucial importance here is the international rule of non-prescription, reflected
in art. 1 of the UN Convention on the Non-applicability of Statutory Limitations to
War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity,29 according to which the passage of time
does not extinguish the obligation to prosecute in cases of genocide and crimes against
humanity. As a consequence of this same principle, the passage of time does not
extinguish the justiciability of claims to restitution. Moreover, there is an obligation
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erga omnes30 not to recognize the material consequences of genocide and crimes
against humanity.
International law has continued its normative development in this direction.
For example, although the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) has no jurisdiction in connection with the Istanbul pogrom, it expands our
understanding of the concept of genocide and its criminalization. Thus, art. 4 of the
1993 Statute of the ICTY defines the crime of genocide, and art. 5(g) lists rape as a
‘‘crime against humanity.’’31
Similarly, art. 6 of the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
(ICC) defines genocide in the terms of the UNCG; art. 7 defines ‘‘crimes against
humanity’’ in terms more explicit than those in the Nuremberg Statute.32 However,
pursuant to art. 11 of the statute, the ICC shall have no competence ratione temporis to
examine events that occurred prior to the entry into force of the statute on 1 July 2002.
In the domain of ‘‘soft law,’’ it is important to recall that in 1992 the UN General
Assembly adopted Resolution 47/121, stipulating that the Yugoslav policy of ‘‘ethnic
cleansing’’ was a ‘‘form of genocide’’;33 in 1995 the General Assembly adopted
Resolution 50/192, which addresses the systematic practice of rape in the context
of ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ and reaffirms
that rape in the conduct of armed conflict constitutes a war crime and that under
certain circumstances it constitutes a crime against humanity and an act of genocide
as defined in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide.34
In the field of international human-rights law, Turkey has been a party to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) since 15 September
2003.35 Article 6 protects the right to life; art. 20 prohibits incitement to racial hatred
and incitement to violence; art. 26 prohibits discrimination; and art. 27 guarantees the
rights of minorities. In November 2006 Turkey also ratified the Optional Protocol to
ICCPR, but added a reservation precluding its retroactive application. In regional
international law, Turkey signed the European Convention on Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms on 4 November 1950 and ratified it on 18 May 1954.36 Turkey
also ratified Protocol I on 22 June 1953. The European Convention protects the right to
life, and its Protocol I protects the right to property. The 1955 pogrom should thus also
be viewed from the perspective of international human-rights law.
Case Law
Bearing in mind that law is not mathematics, judges have to determine how the norms
apply to a particular set of facts. While one judge may conclude that a pogrom
constitutes genocide, another may conclude that it does not go over the threshold.
But since a pogrom entails multiple violations of general principles of law and of
human-rights law, the obligation to punish the guilty and to provide reparation to the
victims is essentially the same.
The Nuremberg judgment of 1946 convicted the Nazis of crimes against humanity,
including genocide.37 Massacres against a state’s own citizens and permanent
residents, such as the victims of the Kristallnacht of 9–10 November 1938, were also
deemed to constitute a ‘‘crime against humanity.’’38
The ICTY has applied the concept of ‘‘genocide’’ to individual massacres and
determined, in the judgment against General Radislav Krstic´,39 that the massacre
of Srebrenica constituted genocide.40 However, not every individual or political
authority associated with the Srebrenica massacre has been charged with or
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convicted of genocide. The ICTY has also held that rape can in certain circumstances
constitute the crime of genocide,41 and in its 2001 judgment against Kunarac, Kovac,
and Vucovic, the ICTY also found that rape constitutes a ‘‘crime against humanity.’’42
The principal architects of the Istanbul pogroms were tried, convicted, and
punished under Turkish law in 1961. Former prime minister Menderes and a total
of 592 other individuals were charged at the Yassiada trials in 1960/1961.
The documentation and testimony emerging from this trial are sufficient to establish
the ‘‘intent’’ of the Menderes government to ‘‘destroy in whole or in part’’ the
Greek minority in Istanbul.43
The Doctrine of State Responsibility for Wrongful Acts
A general principle of international law stipulates that a state is responsible for
injuries caused by its wrongful acts and must provide reparation for such injury.44
The Permanent Court of International Justice enunciated this principle in the
Chorzow Factory Case as follows: ‘‘it is a principle of international law, and even a
general conception of law, that any breach of an engagement involves an obligation to
make reparation.’’45
It should be stressed that the wrong in question is no mere violation of
international law engaging interstate responsibility but the gravest criminal violation
of international law, engaging, as the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has
determined, international responsibility erga omnes—an obligation of the state toward
the international community as a whole.
Thus, the international crime of genocide imposes obligations not only on the state
that perpetrated the genocide but also on the entire international community: (a) not
to recognize as legal a situation created by an international crime, (b) not to assist the
author of an international crime in maintaining the illegal situation, and (c) to assist
other states in the implementation of the aforementioned obligations.46 In a very real
sense, the legal impact of the erga omnes nature of the crime of genocide goes far
beyond the mere retroactivity of application of the UNCG: it imposes an affirmative
obligation on the international community not to recognize an illegal situation
resulting from genocide.
Imprescriptibility of Genocide and Crimes against Humanity
When, in 1968, the United Nations drafted the Convention on the Non-Applicability
of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, it
clearly and deliberately pronounced its retroactive application. Article 1 stipulates
that
No statutory limitation shall apply to the following crimes, irrespective of the date of
their commission . . . crimes against humanity, whether committed in time of war or in
time of peace as they are defined in the charter of the International Military Tribunal,
Nu¨rnberg, of 8 August 1945 . . . and the crime of genocide as defined in the 1948
Convention.’’47
The principle of nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege praevia (no crime
without law, no penalty without previous law), laid out in paragraph 1 of art. 15 of the
ICCPR, is conditioned as follows in para. 2:
Nothing in this article shall prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any
act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according to the
general principles of law recognized by the community of nations.
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Although Turkey is not a state party to the above-mentioned convention, international
law is clear on the subject: there is no prescription on the prosecution of the crime of
genocide, regardless of when the genocide occurred, and the obligation of the
responsible state to make restitution or pay compensation for properties obtained by
means of genocide does not lapse with time.
In its judgment of 6 October 1983 in the case of Klaus Barbie, the
French Cour de Cassation rejected the objections of the defense and stated
that the prohibition on statutory limitations for crimes against humanity is
now part of customary international law.48 France also enacted a law on
26 December 1964 dealing with crimes against humanity as ‘‘imprescriptibles’’
by nature.49
Similarly, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has ruled that ‘‘provisions
on prescription . . . are inadmissible’’ when they ‘‘are intended to prevent the
investigation and punishment of those responsible for serious human rights violations
such as torture, extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary execution and forced disappear-
ance,’’ since they ‘‘violate non-derogable rights recognized by international human
rights law.’’50
Imprescriptibility of the Right to Restitution and Compensation in Cases
of Genocide and Crimes against Humanity
Because of the continuing character of the crime of genocide in factual and legal terms,
the remedy of restitution is not foreclosed by the passage of time.51 Thus the survivors
of the Istanbul pogrom, like the survivors of the massacres against the Greeks of
Pontos and Smyrna, have standing, both individually and collectively, to advance a
claim for restitution. This has also been true for the Jewish survivors of the Holocaust,
who have successfully claimed restitution against many states where their property
was destroyed or confiscated.52 Whenever possible, restitutio in integrum
(complete restitution, restoration to the previous condition) should be granted,
so as to reestablish the situation that existed before the violation occurred.
But where restitutio in integrum is not possible, compensation may be substituted
as a remedy.
Restitution remains a continuing state responsibility also because of Turkey’s
current human-rights obligations under international treaty law, particularly the
corpus of international human-rights law.
The UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to Reparation for Victims of
Gross Violations of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law provide
in part that
Reparation may be claimed individually and where appropriate collectively, by the
direct victims of violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, the
immediate family, dependants or other persons or groups of persons closely connected
with the direct victims.
Particularly important are principle 9:
Statutes of limitations shall not apply in respect of periods during which no
effective remedies exist for violations of human rights or international
humanitarian law. Civil claims relating to reparations for gross violations of human
rights and international humanitarian law shall not be subject to statutes
of limitations.
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and principle 12:
Restitution shall be provided to re-establish the situation that existed prior to the
violations of human rights or international humanitarian law. Restitution requires,
inter alia, . . . return to one’s place of residence and restoration of . . .property.53
Louis Joinet, member of the UN Sub-commission on Prevention of Discrimination
and Protection of Minorities presented two reports containing comparable language:
Any human rights violation gives rise to a right to reparation on the part of the victim
or his beneficiaries, implying a duty on the part of the State to make reparation and the
possibility of seeking redress from the perpetrator.54
Although the ICC, established in July 2002, does not have jurisdiction to examine
instances of genocide that occurred prior to the entry into force of the Rome Statute, it
does reaffirm the international law obligation of providing reparation to victims.
Article 75, para 1, of the Rome Statute stipulates that ‘‘The Court shall establish
principles relating to reparations,’’ which it defines as restitution, compensation, and
rehabilitation.
This obligation under international law to make reparation for violations of rights
is reaffirmed in General Assembly Resolution 60/147 of 16 December 2005. Pursuant to
art. 11 of the principles enumerated in this resolution, the remedies for gross violations
of human rights include the victim’s right to ‘‘(a) equal and effective access to justice;
(b) adequate, effective and prompt reparation for harm suffered; c) access to relevant
information concerning violations and reparation mechanisms.’’ Pursuant to art. 6,
‘‘statutes of limitations shall not apply to gross violations of international human
rights law and serious violations of international humanitarian law which constitute
crimes under international law.’’55
In the context of reparation for gross violations of human rights, two other general
principles are relevant: the principle ex injuria jus non oritur (no right arises from a
wrong), that no state should be allowed to profit from its own violations of law; and the
principle of ‘‘unjust enrichment.’’56 It is a general principle of law that the criminal
cannot keep the fruits of the crime.57
In denying the applicability of statutes of limitation to restitution claims
by survivors of the Holocaust, Irwin Cotler argues,
The paradigm here is not that of restitution in a domestic civil action involving
principles of civil and property law, or restitution in an international context involving
state responsibility in matters of appropriation of property of aliens; rather, the
paradigm—if there can be such a paradigm in so abhorrent a crime—is that
of restitution for Nuremberg crimes, which is something dramatically different in
precedent and principles. . . .Nuremberg crimes are imprescribable [sic],58 for
Nuremberg law—or international laws anchored in Nuremberg Principles—does not
recognize the applicability of statutes of limitations, as set forth in the Convention on
the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against
Humanity.59
The Doctrine of Non-recognition
Hersch Lauterpacht points out that the doctrine of non-recognition is based on
the principle of ex injuria jus non oritur:
This construction of non-recognition is based on the view that acts contrary
to international law are invalid and cannot become a source of legal rights
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for the wrongdoer. That view applies to international law one of ‘‘the general principles
of law recognized by civilized nations.’’ The principle ex injuria jus non oritur is one of
the fundamental maxims of jurisprudence. An illegality cannot, as a rule, become a
source of legal right to the wrongdoer.60
Similarly, the ‘‘Friendly Relations’’ resolution of the General Assembly stipulates that
‘‘No territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force shall be recognized
as legal.’’61 In cases of ‘‘ethnic cleansing,’’ the rights of the entire international
community have been affected, and every state is obliged to refrain from giving
recognition or effect to the consequences of the crime. For instance, art. 10 of the Draft
Declaration on Population Transfer and the Implantation of Settlers concerning the
illegality of population transfers provides in part that ‘‘Where acts or omissions
prohibited in the present Declaration are committed, the international community as a
whole and individual States, are under an obligation . . .not to recognize as legal the
situation created by such acts.’’62
On 9 July 2004 the ICJ issued an advisory opinion on the legality of Israel’s
construction of a security wall, concluding that states had an obligation of
non-recognition:
Given the character and the importance of the rights and obligations involved, the
Court is of the view that all States are under an obligation not to recognize the illegal
situation resulting from the construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem. They are also under an obligation
not to render aid or assistance in maintaining the situation created by such
construction.63
Bringing the Istanbul Pogrom before an International Tribunal
Although Turkey had ratified the European Convention on Human Rights, and was
bound by its provisions, when the Istanbul pogrom took place, the individual
complaints procedure before the European Court under art. 34 of the convention
requires that petitions be submitted within six months after the exhaustion of
domestic remedies. Bearing in mind that the events occurred fifty-two years ago,
the court would now declare the petition inadmissible ratione temporis pursuant to art.
35, para. 1, of the convention.
Interstate complaints, however, may be lodged under art. 33 of the European
Convention, and any state party to the convention could submit such an interstate
application. The friendly settlement procedure could lead to appropriate lump-sum
reimbursements to the victims and their survivors.
Turkey ratified the ICCPR in 2003 and acceded to the Optional Protocol (OP)
thereto in November 2006. By virtue of the OP, the UN Human Rights Committee
(HRC) is thus competent to examine individual complaints against Turkey. However,
Turkey has made a reservation to the OP restricting its application to facts and events
occurring prior to the entry into force of the OP for Turkey, thus excluding any
examination of the violations of the right to life (art. 6) and cruel and degrading
treatment (art. 7) accompanying the Istanbul pogrom. Turkey has also not given the
declaration, under art. 41 of the ICCPR, that would give the HRC competence to
entertain interstate complaints. Thus, the only avenue of redress would be through the
examination of Turkey’s periodic reports to the HRC under art. 40 of the ICCPR.
Although this is not a complaints procedure, the HRC would take cognizance of
the failure of the state party to give appropriate restitution and compensation to the
victims of the Istanbul pogrom.
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Pursuant to art. 34 of the Statute of the ICJ, only states may be parties in cases
before the court. Thus, individuals or groups lack standing before the ICJ. Although
the court can examine ad hoc cases submitted by states parties, it cannot do so if one of
the parties does not accept the ICJ’s competence, and Turkey has let its declaration
under art. 36(2), recognizing as compulsory ipso facto the jurisdiction of the court,
expire.
A contentious case concerning the 1948 UNCG, however, could be entertained
notwithstanding the absence of a declaration by Turkey under art. 36, para. 2, of the
statute. Indeed, pursuant to art. 36, para. 1, this would be possible, because Turkey is
a state party to the UNCG, which stipulates in article 9 that
Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation, application or
fulfillment of the present convention, including those relating to the responsibility
of a State for genocide or for any other acts enumerated in article III, shall be
submitted to the International Court of Justice at the request to any of the parties to the
dispute.
Greece has also been a party to the UNCG since 8 December 1954, that is, since before
the Istanbul pogrom took place. Accordingly, it would be possible for Greece (or for any
other state party to the UNCG) to argue before the ICJ that the Istanbul pogrom
constituted ‘‘genocide’’ within the meaning of the convention and that Turkey is
obliged to ensure appropriate compensation to the victims and their survivors.
Greece (or any state party to the UNCG) could also invoke art. 8 of the UNCG,
which provides that any contracting party may call upon the competent organs of the
United Nations to take such action as they consider appropriate for the ‘‘suppression’’
of genocide. ‘‘Suppression’’ must mean more than just retributive justice. In order to
suppress the crime, it is necessary to suppress, as far as possible, its consequences.
This entails, besides punishing the guilty, providing restitution and compensation
to the surviving generations.
Another possibility would be to have the UN General Assembly, pursuant to art. 96
of the UN Charter, refer the matter to the ICJ for an advisory opinion, as was done in
the cases relating to South Africa’s presence in Namibia in 1970 and of Israel’s security
wall in 2003.64 The ICJ could, pursuant to art. 65 of the ICJ Statute, consider the
question of whether the consistent pattern of Turkey’s anti-Greek measures
constituted ‘‘crimes against humanity’’ or ‘‘genocide,’’ and could then fix the level
of compensation and restitution required.
Admittedly, the criminal law aspects of the UNCG are of lesser relevance in the
context of the Istanbul pogrom, since most of the principal perpetrators of the
Septemvriana are no longer alive or are too old to be prosecuted. On the other hand,
the Greek properties that were destroyed, for which their owners were not sufficiently
compensated, give rise to legitimate claims against the Turkish state. In this context,
it is worth noting the important restitution of many churches and monasteries in the
former Soviet republics, including Armenia—restitution effected in the 1990s for
confiscations that had occurred some seventy years earlier, following the Bolshevik
revolution.65 Based on this precedent, compensation for the damage caused to Greek
churches and monasteries would appear to be not only morally mandated but also
implementable in practice.
A determination by the ICJ that Istanbul Program constituted a form of genocide
would facilitate the settlement of claims for restitution, including the identification of
cultural and other properties destroyed, such as churches, monasteries, and other
assets of historic and cultural significance to the Greek communities of Turkey.
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Conclusion
The Istanbul pogrom was a phase in the Ottoman/Turkish policy of eliminating Greek
communities from their 3,000-year-old homelands in Asia Minor, Thrace, the Aegean,
and Constantinople itself. Seen in the context of a centuries-old process of
discrimination, massacres, and expulsion, it can be classified as a form of genocide.66
At the same time, the Istanbul pogrom also falls within the definition of crimes against
humanity in both the Nuremberg Statute and in the Rome Statute of the ICC. Because
these crimes are not subject to statutes of limitations, Turkey still has important
international legal obligations to meet.
Turkey aspires to membership in the European Union, which is a community not
only of commercial interests but also of certain fundamental moral values.
By acknowledging its responsibility for the Istanbul pogrom, for other massacres,
and for the consistent pattern of religious intolerance,67 Turkey would make
its commitment to human rights, including the right to truth,68 more credible.
It is incompatible with this commitment to human rights that those responsible
for the Istanbul pogrom have been rehabilitated, and schools and airports named
after them. This state of affairs poses a serious challenge to the European
community.69
A modern, democratic Turkey, bound by the European Convention on Human
Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, must still address
these issues.
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1. Rita Thalmann, ‘‘Kristallnacht,’’ in Encyclopedia of Genocide and Crimes against
Humanity, ed. Dinah Shelton, vol. 2, 626–28 (Woodbridge, CT: Macmillan Reference,
2004). No less than 257 synagogues and some 7,500 shops were destroyed or damaged.
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violence caused considerable property damage in Chisinau, the capital of Bessarabia
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permanently, in addition to the Greeks who had been expelled. The Greeks were not
allowed to sell their houses or property or to take money from their bank accounts.’’
Whitman, The Greeks of Turkey, 9.
67. The Amor Report, para. 166, recommends that ‘‘The Government should take all necessary
measures, consistent with international human rights standards, to combat hatred,
intolerance and acts of violence, intimidation and coercion motivated by religious
intolerance.’’
68. In April 2005 the UN Commission on Human Rights adopted a relevant resolution:
On Right to the Truth, UN CHR Resolution 2005/66, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2005/66
(20 April 2005).
69. The awkwardness of the prevailing situation can be demonstrated by a
hypothetical example. How would the international community have reacted if the
post-war German government had named streets after Josef Goebbels and Reinhard
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Heydrich, the architects of Kristallnacht? What would the reaction of the international
community have been if, instead of making moral and material reparation, the German
government had refused to render restitution and compensation to the victims and their
survivors?
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